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 Rationality and Reasonableness in Ethics 
 
 
 I hope I can provoke Jack Bemporad into a response, because 
Jack and I have collaborated at a distance and I much admire his work 
in the Center for Christian-Jewish Understanding here at Sacred 
Heart. I think he's lucky to be with you and I think you're lucky to have 
him. In any event, we're not like those people in the Congress who 
were denounced by Speaker Reed long ago: ``The Honorable 
Gentlemen never contribute to debate without subtracting from the 
total of human knowledge.'' 
 Yesterday I was in Florida overnight to attend a meeting of a 
group that's interested in intellectual questions about, of all things, 
marketing. These are people, big people, both in advertising agencies 
and in major corporations and organizations like the U.S. Post Office: 
people who can learn from a two day seminar. A colleague of mine 
was giving a very interesting lecture. I went precisely because I wanted 
to hear what he had to say in this case, which proved very profitable in 
a quite unexpected way: gave me a kind of opening line for what I 
wanted to talk about today. 
 What he was concerned with, and what he was warning people 
about in the whole business area, was an issue which was not 
specifically to do with business ethics but to do with how people engage 
in public affairs and business: in particular, how they should think 
about the problems that they have and the errors that they can make. 
What he was doing was saying, Well you know, any of you who study 
statistics will have been told about the two different kinds of technical 
errors that exist in statistics. But I'm going to tell you about a third type 
of error. The third type of error is the pervasive danger of spending 
your time finding the right answer to _______________ 
Stephen Toulmin is the Henry Luce Professor of International Relations and 
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the wrong question. And what he did was to produce a string of very 
interesting examples of cases in which problem-solving in business and 
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the management of business went astray because people gave an 
enormous amount of effort to getting very precise and exact answers to 
questions which didn't really meet the situation they were actually 
concerned with. At the end of the meeting he got them to fill out forms 
to try to show that they understood the different ways in which by 
insisting on a precise answer to the wrong question you can in fact get 
yourself entirely off the rails. 
 He told a very nice story, which I'll begin with if I may. There was 
a skyscraper down in Manhattan where the offices were rented out to a 
whole lot of different people and after a while there started being all 
these complaints about the elevator service. These became so frequent 
that the owners had to do something about it, so they decided that they 
must bring in a consultant. So who did they get as a consultant? They 
got an elevator man who designed and ran elevators, and he came in 
and studied the matter as best he could, and came back with a report 
that probably what they really needed to do was to replace the whole 
elevator system, that there were the following techniques that they 
could use for making the running of the elevators more uniform, etc., 
etc., and for accommodating more people in the elevators and the rest. 
What was the estimate of the repairs that they needed? Five million 
dollars. It would be cheaper, really, to replace the entire elevator 
system, but you could do a kind of band-aid job for a couple of 
million. 
 The question was: What were they to do? This was really out of 
proportion to the rental income and the rest. Then one of the tenants 
who happened to be a psychologist came to them and said, Look, I 
think you may be getting hold of this problem by the wrong end. 
Actually, the amount of time that the people spend waiting for the 
elevator in this building is not out of proportion different to the 
amount of time they spend waiting for the elevator in other buildings. 
The trouble is, the places where they wait are so unattractive and so 
featureless. If you install mirrors in each of the places where they wait 
for elevators, they'll be able to look at themselves and adjust their ties 
and feel more at home and the rest. Estimate: fifty grand to equip the 
whole building with new mirrors. 
 Now, the question my friend was raising, the question I want to get 
in the middle of your mind to begin with, is the following: It's not that 
I'm saying that one solution was better than the other solution, that one 
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person saw the point while the other person didn't see the point. The 
important thing was to be prepared to recognize that when you find 
yourself in a problematic situation, you have to go and see what's going 
on. You have to go into the situation. You have to ask not only 
technical questions but also human questions; you have to ask human 
questions of unexpected kinds; and your fundamental error may be 
the error of taking it for granted before you start that you know what 
the problem is. Of course, if you know what the problem is, you can 
find an exact solution to it very quickly. But that's not where human 
wisdom lies. Human wisdom lies in being open to the idea that we're 
not yet clear in our heads what the human problem really is, and then 
the error of the third kind is one of a number of different ways in 
which we can distract ourselves from understanding what's the way of 
handling the situation. The task is not the task of answering a technical 
question: the task is the task of handling a situation in which technical 
problems may or may not be involved. And the curious thing is ─ and 
this is a general comment on the way in which we conduct our public 
affairs ─ the curious thing is how much of the time we spend looking 
for the dime under the lamppost because that's the only place we can 
see. You know the old story. 
 For instance, it may not appear that this is true of me, but there 
are some things which irritate me quite out of proportion, and four 
times a year I'm irritated when the weather forecast man will say things 
of the form, ``Spring begins at 3:36 P.M. Eastern Standard Time this 
afternoon.'' This is a perfect example of a precise answer to the wrong 
question, a precise statement about an irrelevant fact. If it were really 
true that spring were something that could begin to the minute at 3:34 
rather than 3:35, then it would be impossible for us to say such things 
as ``Spring came late that year.'' The fact is that anybody for whom the 
names of the seasons are tied up with the whole way in which their 
lives go, whether they're farmers, or tourists, or travel agents, or 
children wanting to play games, or whatever it may be, so far as the 
names of the seasons are tied into the fabrics of our lives, the question 
of putting an exact date and an exact moment to the minute at which 
one season or another begins, is missing the point. But of course what 
it does do, and this is a point that I shall come back to later on, is to 
remind you of the extent to which our whole way of thinking about the 
world we live in and the whole way in which we think about the ways 
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the world we live in are to be understood, has become for two or three 
hundred years now ─ we can argue about exactly how long ─ has 
become during what we are pleased to call the ``modern period'' 
dominated by a particular astronomical picture. 
 I was visiting a friend in Toronto and found myself in the family's 
spare bedroom and looked around the shelves for something to read 
and I found a very nice quality paperback edition of Adam Smith's 
book, The Wealth of Nations. And I was very interested because in 
this book is reprinted, of all things ─ it was the last thing you would 
expect to find there if you didn't know ─ a copy of an essay that Adam 
Smith wrote on the subject of astronomy. Now why was Adam Smith 
writing about astronomy? He was writing about astronomy because he 
had invented a new way of thinking about human social affairs and he 
wanted to be able to do this systematically, and he wanted to be able to 
show people what it was to have an intellectual system and to build a 
new discipline into the form of an intellectual system, so he wrote 
about astronomy: he wrote about Newton's intellectual system in the 
Principia, in which he organized the theory of motion and the theory 
of planetary attraction and the rest into this beautiful intellectual 
system, and said, So you see this is the kind of theory that my new 
science of The Wealth of Nations should fit into. 
 I have another pet peeve ─ not about Adam Smith, whom I 
admire enormously because he also wrote a wonderful book called 
The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, which you have to read in 
conjunction with the Wealth of Nations. But I do have a pet peeve 
about things that have happened within economic theory since Adam 
Smith which oversimplify and over-codify what he did. As with the case 
of giving the term ``spring'' an astronomical interpretation, in the same 
way it seems to me that in our public affairs we continue to prefer to 
discuss problems for which calculated solutions can be found over 
problems about which our understanding has essentially to be 
qualitative, that is, concerned with the qualities of life, the qualities of 
experience, and the qualitative aspects which are involved in problems. 
For instance, we have all come across reading the newspaper, 
especially the Wall Street Journal, the phrase ``gross domestic 
product.'' I'm sure you all understand the following point. Suppose I 
get in my car and I drive home and in the course of driving home in 
my car I have an accident and I total the car. Then I call the tow-truck, 
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I get in touch with my insurance company. If the car is truly totalled, I 
buy a new car. You know, of course, that in all these ways, I am 
contributing to the gross domestic product. If I drive my car home 
carefully and park it in the garage without damaging it, I am depriving 
the national prosperity of the contribution that I would make by having 
an accident. We can giggle, but it's true: this is the way the standard 
national statistics are computed. 
 It's only monetary transactions which are counted. So the 
contribution that parents make, especially women, to the social fabric 
by the work they do at home, for which no payment is made, don't 
count in the sense that they are not counted. Therefore, when people 
ask about how the welfare of the family is to be evaluated and included 
in our national accounting and in the ways we think about public affairs 
─ the crucial actions by which the members of one family contribute to 
the health of that family and the members of another family let the 
whole place run in a slovenly way ─ there is no allowing for this in the 
way the accounts are managed. So that the fact is that where we have 
suitable technical abstractions, where we have formal mathematical 
calculations, we are tempted to pay serious attention to those from the 
standpoint of public policy and if the results appear to us in certain 
respects bizarre, this is something which should make us look again 
more carefully at the role of theory in the evaluation of our actual 
situation and the importance of understanding not just how technical 
problems can be solved by calculations but also how things truly 
impact in a non-quantifiable way on human life. 
 I spent a good deal of time working with doctors and others in the 
field of medical ethics, and I spent quite a number of years working 
with a Congressional commission concerned with, in particular, the 
ethics of human experimentation, the ethics of biomedical 
experiments in which human beings were the research subjects, and 
the rest. And one of the things I came to understand about ethics as a 
result of this work led me back to the most enormous appreciation of 
the work of Aristotle ─ Aristotle who was himself a doctor and the son 
of a doctor and came from a real medical family. One of the things 
that led me to this conclusion was finding myself really confronted with 
the question what the relationship is between the biomedical sciences 
and the arts of clinical medicine. Because indeed we have been 
through a period of about fifty years, from just before the first World 
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War right through to the early 1960s, during which the main effort of 
policy, both within the medical profession and in the country at large 
with regard to medicine, had been with increasing the scientific content 
of medical practice, the scientific content of medical training. 
 From a time when for many physicians all you said when scientists 
came along, was ``Well, that's all very well in theory but . . .'' from this 
time around the turn of the twentieth century on through to the sixties, 
education in medicine had been increasingly concerned with 
improving the scientific knowledge of physicians, which was of course 
extremely important. (Nothing that I'm going to say is in any way 
intended to suggest anything else.) But what happened along the way is 
that many of the traditional maxims and arts of the clinical physician, 
of the bedside doctor, we lost the sense of the doctor as the person at 
the bedside, the person who was essentially committed to the person 
of the patient. All good doctors, like our joint friend Eric Cassell and 
so on, will speak very eloquently about the toting of the balance in 
favor of the technical content of medicine at the expense of the 
personal care, how this had developed and how hard it was to push the 
balance back into a healthier balance. 
 Now, the point I want to make is the following. In recent years ─ 
and I regard this basically as absolutely desirable, absolutely admirable 
─ in recent years, while the technical improvements in medicine have 
gone on absolutely apace, there has been a very conscious effort to do 
two things. Firstly, to revive in medical education the component of 
clinical ethics, of clinical understanding, an awakening in the minds of 
the medical profession of the extent to which traditional medical 
practice embodied a certain kind of human value which is just as 
important and just as central to the practice of the medical arts as the 
scientific component, indispensable as the scientific component may 
be. And the second new thing is that instead of the practice of 
medicine being simply the concern of the doctor and of the doctors as 
a profession, it has been necessary to open up the channels of 
communication between doctors and their patients and the patients' 
families and the patients' spiritual advisors and the public at large and 
community representatives, and this whole dialogue, trialogue, 
polylogue has opened up between people engaged directly in the 
clinical practice of medicine and all those other human beings whose 
presence on the scene forms a part of the overall constellation of 
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persons, of humans, which defines the problem. 
 I have in mind the traditional complaint that the purely scientific 
doctor isn't interested in the patient, he is interested in the disease. The 
patient in the bed is a very interesting case of meningitis. So that what 
has been happening in the past thirty years, and this seems to me to be 
one example of a remarkable shift which has been taking place and 
which I'll come back and say a bit more about in a few minutes, what 
has happened is that we see a situation in which the clinical problems 
of medicine are once again recognized as problems which inescapably 
have both a technical component and a moral component, both a 
scientific component and a human and a humane component, and 
that the merits, the virtues of the medical art ─ and you can substitute 
any other profession you like: I'm just taking medicine as a convenient 
example ─ the virtues of the professional arts are the virtues of seeing 
how to balance the claims on the practitioner which come from his 
special technical knowledge and the claims which come to him as a 
person who has a particularly intimate relationship with a person, with 
the people with whose welfare it is his business to be concerned with. 
 Now, I will finally come around to saying something which actually 
connects with the title I gave for this lecture, namely, ``Rationality and 
Reasonableness in Ethics.'' Many of us, for quite a number of years, 
have felt that there are plenty of situations in which somebody who has 
as near passed away as makes no difference, is having their metabolism 
maintained, having their bodily functions maintained by artificial 
means beyond the point at which any meaningful contribution can be 
said to be being made to that individual's welfare in any sense. Now, 
what is the nature of the complaint? The nature of the complaint is 
certainly not that it's irrational to keep the person on life-support. To 
the extent that rationality is concerned with efficiency and technical 
competence and doing the best one can, there's nothing on the face of 
it irrational about it. On the other hand, one does want to say that if it's 
not doing the patient any good, it's quite unreasonable to keep this 
artificial respiration machine pumping away or whatever it is. So this is 
a first example I want to give you of a way in which already in our 
common-sense ways of thinking and speaking we show the feeling we 
have for the need to balance the technically skilled against the humanly 
perceptive into the correct way or a desirable way of handling the 
profession. 
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 I have a good friend at Holy Cross, Father John Paris, who's a 
Jesuit with the proverbially sharp Jesuit mind. He tends to precipitate 
himself into politically sensitive situations, especially if they have to do 
with this life-support system. He likes to tell a story, he likes to use an 
image to capture people's minds. Supposing you are in the hollows of 
West Virginia and granny is dying and she's sitting up comfortably in 
bed and the family is gathered around and they are ready to have the 
last rites or whatever their particular spiritual counterpart is, and 
somebody bursts in with a life-support machine and starts wanting to 
shove tubes down. The family will say, ``What are you up to? Leave 
Granny alone.'' You may be able to make out a technical case for 
doing this, but she's ready to go, the family is with her, things couldn't 
be better for her, all told. The family doctor's here. He and his 
colleagues are well satisfied; no more palliation will serve a useful 
purpose. This is a nice example, and when John Paris tells this kind of 
story in his eloquent way, I think you have some feeling for how some 
action can be both highly rational and yet quite unreasonable, and 
remind us of this task that we continue to have of balancing them off 
against one another. 
 What I really wanted to talk about, and this I'll come onto very 
quickly: Something very strange happened to ethics in the course of 
the seventeenth century. In my Cosmopolis book I've tried to explain 
something about the historical situation in which this happened. 
Suddenly in the middle of the seventeenth century people wanted to 
make ethics technical, wanted to turn ethics into a theory, and when 
you start thinking in a comparative kind of way about all the great 
religions that there are and have existed in the world, and about the 
history of our own faith, the history of our own beliefs, the thing you 
realize is, this is the only time in the history of the world when people 
have seriously tried to make ethics a matter for a highly formal 
hypothetico-deductive or what-not kind of theory. And what I think is 
more important is that for seventy-five percent of the history of 
Christianity to date, the concern of ethics was pastoral and practical 
and case-based, just as it is in all the other great religious traditions: 
Confucianism, Judaism, the best of Islam, Buddhism. I'm not talking 
against abstract theory as an intellectual exercise for philosophy 
departments; I'm talking about the attempt to make abstract theories 
applicable in practical situations. I think this is the first time that it 
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happened. And historically in certain important respects it came to 
divide those who followed this line from the whole history of human 
endeavor in the ethical field. 
 Now let me immediately say something which is extremely 
important. I'm not making a point about either Catholicism or 
Protestantism or any other denomination. This was a historical 
phenomenon which covered the waterfront and which I still find 
historically rather strange. If you go back to the high Middle Ages and 
look at the state of ethics at its greatest point of development ─ both 
moral theology and moral practice ─ I think one of the wisest things 
that you find in Aquinas is the explanation of what he calls ratio 
naturalis, or natural reason, the understanding that in all essential 
respects ethics is concerned with our ability to recognize and deal with 
human situations that arise equally for people of different kinds from 
whatever community they come. And in fact the great Catholic moral 
theologians in the Middle Ages were true to their understanding in this 
respect. For instance, one of the major sources of examples that they 
discussed was Cicero's great essay, De Officciis, ``On Duties and 
Obligations.'' So Cicero and Aristotle, neither of whom were . . . of 
course you could say that they were hidden Christians, but this is 
simply a rhetorical dodge. The fact is that for Aquinas that, as with the 
Noachic code in Judaism, there was a clear understanding for Aquinas 
that except where specifically religious obligations were concerned, for 
most of these things, the issues were ones which were the concerns of 
people from all backgrounds in the same kind of way. 
 So the question as I want to ask is, How it was that ethical theory, 
which was basically invented in the middle of the seventeenth century, 
in its modern form, as a result of a correspondence between Henry 
More in England and René Descartes in France, the beginning of what 
was known as the school of the Cambridge Platonists, how this came to 
be taken up and came to shape the ways in which public debate about 
ethics was carried on. And here it does seem to me what I have to say 
is that something of the same kind happens here as happens, for 
instance, in the case of the car crash and the gross domestic product. 
Because there are ways in which, whether as utilitarians or 
deontologists or consequentialists or whatever, that because there are 
these technical discussions which philosophers can very properly 
engage in and make as sophisticated as they please, we have a feeling 
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that these theories ought to be applied in actual practice, even where 
their effect is to override human wisdom and our human sensitivity: 
even where, as in economics, they lead us to counter-intuitive results 
which offend our natural sense of what's reasonable. 
 Now of course within the Roman tradition for many years these 
two traditions continue to coexist in parallel with one another, and 
indeed some of the most subtle and highly respected work in case 
ethics in pastoral theology was done in the eighteenth century after the 
casuistical enterprise that I wrote about with my friend Al Johnson, 
after this tradition had been exposed to hostile attacks by Pascal. So 
moral theology continued, but what happened after a while was that 
the theoretical contributions, the attempt to produce very sharp and 
strongly deductive arguments, entered the field of apologetics in a way 
in which it had not previously won a place within moral theology itself. 
And I'll give you a kind of index about this which I think shows you 
what for me is terribly close to the bone. I listen to NPR. I'm full of 
admiration for your NPR station. I think It's a great thing that Sacred 
Heart has this established place in what seems to me a very important 
national institution. I listen to NPR. I listen to other broadcasts, other 
television networks, and so on, and you keep hearing these journalists 
and politicians who are terribly much concerned with whether 
something is right or whether it's wrong. And I want to say that a 
preoccupation with the question, ``Is this right or is this wrong?'' is a 
preoccupation which may be appropriate in arithmetic ─ I mean, the 
question is, Did you get the right answer or not? Did you do the 
calculation right? ─ but really it stands in the way of human 
understanding in the field of ethics. 
 If you think about how you evaluate the actions of your friends, 
the situations that your friends find themselves in, surely the better you 
understand the people who are involved the more likely you are to end 
by saying something like, What she did was understandable, but 
regrettable. Or you say, Well of course what she did was terribly 
admirable, but it was rather overdoing it. Or we say ─ I quote today's 
USA Today, from the editorial that they report from the New England 
Journal of Medicine ─ that the administration's stance against the 
medical uses of marijuana is ``misguided, heavy-handed, and 
inhumane.'' Or you say, just once in a while you say of something 
somebody has done, that it was quite unpardonable. The adjectives, 
10
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the evaluations which enter into our lives are not right and wrong: that's 
turning human relations into arithmetic. What we are concerned with 
is: Was it admirable? Was it overdoing it? Was it inhumane? You can 
make a long list of these evaluations and our moral understanding and 
the sensitivity of our moral understanding is measured by our ability to 
recognize and to apply all these different terms to the kind of human 
situations in which they're appropriate. And it seems to me that just as 
in medicine the humane clinician is one who truly understands what 
the impact of the technical treatment that he is recommending for a 
patient ─ what the impact of this will be on the patient's human 
situation, given who they are, what their relatives are, what family 
background they come from, what the consequences of a particular 
treatment would be, and so on ─ so in the same way, when we are 
dealing with a personal situation, we need to understand the character 
of these situations with all the sensibility and appreciation of 
complexity that are associated with clinical medicine. 
 I want to say a little bit not only about personal ethics, where I 
believe that the way of charity is the way of understanding cases, rather 
than the way of charity as contrasted with the way of dogmatism, comes 
from understanding in detail human situations. I want also to talk a 
little bit about the changing role of the professions in the world. Your 
president was explaining to me that Sacred Heart dates from 1963. 
This is a date that resonates in my mind because it's a date immediately 
after the time when Rachel Carson had published her book Silent 
Spring. I mention Silent Spring because in the early 1960s, when 
Rachel Carson was writing that book, ecology and the environment 
had no effective political significance at all. The local, the regional, the 
national, the international aspects of the enviornment were just not 
part of people's, not part of politicians', not part of public 
administrators' imagination. 
 In thirty five years, how the scene has changed. In thirty five years, 
how we have come to understand the importance not of cutting back 
on our technical development ─ the improvements of technology, 
whatever Heidegger may say, are in their many ways extraordinary 
contributions to human life ─ but what we have come to understand is 
that technology as applied, is always applied, in situations and that it's 
as important to understand the way in which this technology is being 
put to use in a particular situation as it is to be skilled at the 
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development and use of the technology itself. The technological 
imperatives have to be balanced against the human impact again in the 
same way that the technical skills of the physician have to be handled, 
balanced against their human impact. 
 I have a good friend in Tokyo, from whom I've learned a lot. He 
was in charge of the construction of the artificial island in Osaka Bay 
which is now the foundation for Kansai International Airport. He has a 
good sense of the importance of understanding what his work as a 
clinical engineer does to the people who he is involved with. And in 
fact out of the conversations we've had together he's developed a kind 
of whole movement in Japan among his fellow engineers concerned 
with what he calls ``humanizing technology,'' which is a phrase which 
I'm very happy to sign on under. 
 When the airport was beginning to be designed, there were all 
kinds of complaints from local groups, including environmental 
groups, who were quite sure that this airport was going to ruin the 
habitat for the fish of Osaka Bay, and one of the things that he carried 
away from that whole experience of building that airport was the 
following. When they started building it, afterward, really quite quickly, 
they discovered that the fish loved it. The fish loved it. The more they 
built the foundations, and so on, the more the fish decided that there 
were wonderful new habitats for them to go to inhabit. So he became, 
simply on the basis of this experience, convinced that his task as an 
engineer was not just to calculate how many piles he needed or what 
dimensions and how deep they should be thrust into the subfloor: he 
also had to think of what he was producing as a contribution to the 
ecology of the habitats in Osaka Bay, so that again the technology and 
the impact went hand in hand. 
 I want to end by saying why, in this situation, I think it's no 
accident that Aristotle was a doctor and the son of a doctor, because 
what he says and what I think is still the key sentence in Book 1 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics is that you have to understand the difference 
between mathematical problems, for which you can generate timeless 
solutions, and the respect in which all the decisions we make of a 
moral or practical kind have about them the essential aspect of 
timeliness. He says that the two disciplines, the two exercises in which 
one sees how much timeliness enters into actions are medicine, but 
also, as he says, helmsmanship. The steersman in a boat. I've sailed 
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through the Greek islands, one of the things I've been lucky enough to 
do. I know very well from having been sailing in Greece and 
elsewhere: you tack towards the shore, you don't know how fast the 
land is shoaling ─ that is, getting shallower ─ you just have to be 
looking at the surface of the water and what you can see below the 
surface of the water, and you change tack where you judge that if you 
go any further, you'll run aground. There's no algorithm: true, if you 
have one of these electric pulse depth meters, that helps, but in the last 
resort the decisions you take are decisions which are taken on the basis 
of the technical characteristics of your boat together with your sense of 
the precise situation you find ourselves in, and this situation is one 
which whether you are a steersman in a boat or a clinician at a bedside, 
which you can only take if you think of them not just as a matter of 
technical calculation but of human judgment, human judgment of a 
kind which is essentially concerned with exactly where you are, exactly 
when you have to act, exactly who you are dealing with, and all the 
different interactions between these factors. I say this as one who began 
as a physicist, who still loves physics, but who has made it his life's 
business to try to understand what physics is there for and therefore 
how we can be sure not to make my friend's third kind of mistake, how 
we can avoid spending our time getting the right answer to the wrong 
questions, applying an admirable theory to a situation to which it 
doesn't really apply. 
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